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One of the more challenging, yet least examined areas of federal and 
federating state relationships, is that of legal systems and legal traditions. 
For several countries wherein their exists more than one legal system (for 
example, within Great Britain –England and Scotland) or among a group of 
countries contemplating a closer legal association (for example, the 
European Community) the matter of applied law can become most 
complex. In Canada the existence and applicability of two great legal 
systems, the British common law and the French civil law, has been 
acknowledged in a very extensive effort to develop legal terminology which 
permits law both to be understood and to be applied equally in both 
systems. 
The term “bijuralism” has emerged as a descriptive term for the 
“coexistence of two legal traditions within a single state”. Canada, 
therefore, is considered to a bijural country because the civil law and the 
common law coexist in both official languages. We have suggested the 
term multijural to accommodate those states wherein “more than two legal 
systems coexist” and which may included “more than two official or widely 
employed languages”1. 
As Canada has emerged in the forefront of bijuralism we have sought 
to apply an inclusive definition in order to examine the issue of within a 
diversity of contexts and states. For example, where several forms of 
customary law and traditions exist within states we would argue that the 
term multijural would be applicable. Furthermore, when one overlays 
custom, tradition and formal legal codes with linguistic diversity be it official 
languages or simply regional languages with general regional applicability, 
multijuralism helps us to understand and to analyse the manner in which 
diverse peoples within a single state envision their specific relationship to 
the body or bodies of applicable law. Thus, in many federal and federative 
states, formal and informal bijuralism and multijuralism may coexist. Spain, 
Switzerland, Italy, France (Corsica), the United Kingdom instantly come to 
mind within Europe. Elsewhere, in Africa countries such as the Republic of 
South Africa and Nigeria and, in Asia countries such as India, Indonesia 
and Malaysia suggest that research may be appropriate insofar as multiple 
legal traditions and languages co-exist. 
In this discussion we shall simply introduce the topic of bijuralism and 
offer some explanation for why Canada has moved forward into the lead in 
the world in to moving formally towards a bijural legal system. Bijuralism is 
much more widespread than might first been presumed. Bijuralism implies 
the co-existence of two legal traditions and their interaction and formal 
integration into specific contexts, for example, a legal agreement or 
contract. Bijuralism in the Canadian context is as much a part of the 
developing federal system as it is a part of the country’s legal system. 
That Canada is a federal state is of great significance in this initiative 
because the applicable constitution’s allocation of constitutional 
competencies clearly places Canada in the category of federal state. 
Furthermore, as argued in various contexts elsewhere (Brown-John, 1988; 
1995; 1996; 1997), Canada may very well be the “most federal” of all 
federal states as provinces have moved into the status of equal partners 
within the single Canadian polity. 
Arguably, successful federal and federative states which incorporate 
two or more formal or informal legal systems or traditions and two or more 
languages –official or regional– are in a position where the very nature and 
quality of the federal or other relationship offers a requirement for laws to 
be drafted, applied and interpreted with facility among legal traditions and 
languages. Clearly, laws should mean the same thing to all people within a 
political system. And, just as importantly, laws should be interpreted by 
judicial authorities with the same level of comprehensibility for those 
affected by such interpretations. 
Almost by definition federal states are complex. Constitutions define 
competencies and residual authorities. Sovereignties can be bifurcated 
within federal states. Canada, for example, offers an excellent example of 
divided sovereignty. Take , for example, ownership of public lands such as 
national parks2. The concept begins within the constitutional term: “Crown 
ownership of land”. All land which is not privately owned in Canada belongs 
to “the state” manifest in constitutional terms as “The Crown” or, more 
specifically, “the Crown by Right of Canada”3.  
Theoretically it is an indivisible “Crown” and thus, in principle all land 
irrespective of its physical location which land has not been otherwise 
assigned belongs to the Crown by right. Naturally, while the Crown is 
“presumed indivisible”, in practise the responsibilities and role of the Crown 
are entirely “divisible”4. As an Executive entity the “Crown” is divided in 
accordance with the distribution of powers set forth in the Constitution. 
Thus, while it may still be one indivisible Crown, it is a Crown (however 
titled) nevertheless which exercises both provincial and federal powers as 
set forth in the Constitution and as interpreted by the Courts. 
The “Crown by right of Canada” and the “Crown by right of any 
province” are distinct legal entities5. Hence it follows, for example, that 
provinces may assign “Crown lands” to provincial parks while the federal 
government may assign federal Crown lands to federal or national parks. 
As a ‘legal person’, the Crown by right of Canada or in right of a province 
has exactly the same powers to do anything it chooses as would any other 
legal person be that person an individual or corporation. 
More importantly if the federal government, for example, proposes to 
expand a federal national park and to include land within provincial 
jurisdiction, it may do so only with the agreement of the provincial 
government. To illustrate, Section 2 of the National Parks Act 
(Interpretation) defines “public lands” as: 
“...lands belonging to Her Majesty in right of Canada or of which the 
Government of Canada has, subject to the terms of any agreement 
between the Government of Canada and the government of the 
province in which the lands are situated, power to dispose, 
including any waters on or flowing through, and the natural 
resources of, those lands”. 
Understanding the division of sovereignty is important in the context of 
bijuralism because of the constitutional division of powers within the 
Canadian constitution. Sections 91 and 92 are the primary division of 
constitutional competencies in Canada. Additional competencies are 
specified in Sections 92A (natural resources), 93 (education –exclusively 
provincial), 94A (pensions) and 95 (concurrent powers –agriculture and 
immigration)6. ‘Property and civil rights’ are exclusively assigned to the 
provinces (Section 92(13)) and yet, as suggested above, even the creation 
of a “national” park within a province raises issues of property rights and 
the prospect of federal-provincial negotiated relations. 
Federalism is much more than a distribution of powers and political 
competencies. American commentator Ivo Duchacek (1970) and Swiss 
analyst Max Frenkel (1984) both argued vigorously that a federal 
relationship without a corresponding ‘federal political culture’ cannot 
function as a federal state. Culture clearly incorporates a desire and a will 
to respect the inherent diversity of the federally constituted political system. 
That diversity includes language, culture, histories and religions. In the 
Canadian case, as in many other states, it also includes legal traditions. 
Commenting upon Canada, the dean of federal studies the late Daniel 
Elazar (1987, 195) noted that Canada had emerged as a “compound polity” 
with a “strong will to federate in the pursuit of national unity, which in turn, 
has intensified the political cultural dimensions of its federalism”7. 
As Canada moves forward in the development of bijuralism it can be 
argued that the very dynamics of federalism are both affected and, 
perhaps, strengthened. For this reason it seems appropriate to offer an 
introduction to the Canadian experience with bijuralism for those who would 
find in this applied experience insights into how diversity within federal and 
federative political systems function. 
Bijuralism in Canada: Background8 
In some respects the origins of bijuralism can be traced both to the 
roots of the constitutional division of powers and to the intricacies of 
statutory interpretation.  
The constitutional roots are both interesting and, at times, 
controversial. A British conquest was affirmed in The Treaty of Paris of 
1760. The legal system then in place (Coutume de Paris) was continued 
and this, in turn, promoted a practise and the development of custom 
distinct from anything the British might have imposed. In an effort to 
introduce some form of British juridical system, Governor Murray issued an 
order in September 1764, establishing civil courts. However, judgements 
were to be made in accordance with British law although the courts could 
take into account French custom and laws insofar as they related to French 
inhabitants of the colony. The status of French laws and customs was 
extended to all cases involving inhabitants of the Quebec colony in July 
1766. The Governor’s new order effectively created a “bijural” system by 
requiring that juries be composed of British born subjects in civil actions 
among British born subjects and that juries be composed of ‘Canadians’ in 
civil cases involving only ‘Canadians’. Where cases involved British 
subjects and ‘Canadians’, upon request, juries could be comprised of equal 
numbers9. 
A new British statute, the  Quebec Act, 1774, provided that existing 
French law (jus commune) would continue to apply to matters of property 
and civil rights within the Quebec colony. Bijuralism was officially 
entrenched in the 1774 statute as it provided that the English common law 
was to apply to matters of public and criminal law while civil law matters 
were to be governed by the civil law and existing codes. This distinctive 
legal system for Quebec was confirmed again in 1841, after the rebellions 
in Upper and Lower Canada, in the 1841 Act of Union of the two Canadas. 
Full confirmation of the status of the civil law as the law applicable to 
civil actions in Quebec was established with promulgation of the Code Civil 
du Québec in 1866 –one year before Canadian Confederation. 
This bifurcation of applied civil and criminal law was continued into 
Canada’s constitution, the 1867 British North America Act10 where criminal 
law was placed within federal jurisdiction (Section 91) and property and civil 
rights were assigned to provincial jurisdiction (Section 92). Hence, by 1867 
the two distinct legal systems were well entrenched. Quebec preserved its 
civil law while the other provinces retained their common law systems. 
The confirmation of “property and civil rights”11 as exclusive provincial 
competencies forms a basis for what is termed, in practise, a 
“complementary relationship” between federal law and provincial private 
law. Thus, provincial laws can “complement” federal laws where such 
federal laws are silent on particular matters. Provincial private law, 
however, cannot be employed to offset the federal Parliament’s failure to 
exercise its primary power over a matter12. In other words, the provinces 
cannot employ their power over property and civil rights to invade a federal 
related competency. This subject of “complementarity” will be explored in 
more detail below when we examine changes in the federal Interpretation 
Act. 
On the subject of statutory interpretation, it needs to be remembered 
that statutory interpretation really consists of rules, directives, instructions, 
maxims, notions and even presumptions emerging from centuries of judicial 
interpretation of laws and/or statutes. Statutory interpretation takes on 
greater significance when a judicial system must function in a bilingual or 
multilingual context especially where concepts and notions of law are not 
entirely similar as between the two legal systems. Two distinct legal 
traditions, each premised upon unique qualities, can either perceive the 
same type of subject differently or, in some cases, not even acknowledge a 
concept. Take, for example, a subject so fundamental to the common law, 
the status of “the Crown”. 
The complete Canadian legal system actually consists of two legal 
systems –the civil code of Quebec and the common law of the other nine 
provinces and three territories. Both legal systems reflect valued linguistic 
and cultural dimensions of the Canadian federal system. The Crown, 
because it is in effect “the state”, inherently possesses certain privileges in 
the common law. For example, in taxation law the Crown possesses the 
privilege of hypothec –the right to retain the obligation of a debtor (eg. as in 
a mortgage) to compensate a creditor. The Crown privilege in common law 
is the right to attach a an outstanding debt to a creditor or taxpayer in 
preference to all other debt claimants. The concept of Crown privilege is 
embedded in the common law however the same is not so in civil law. 
Indeed, the 1866 Civil Code of Québec provides for a basic form of Crown 
recourse in only four provisions usually including the phrase les délits 
civils13. 
Thus, just prior to Canadian Confederation in 1867, the status of the 
civil law was affirmed for Quebec in the 1866 Civil Code of Quebec14. The 
Civil Code, however, contains no privileged place for the Crown in private 
law. In practise this has meant that certain legal recourses were available 
for, and against, the Crown within common law jurisdictions in Canada the 
same recourses were not available in the same manner to residents of 
Quebec. Estates and inheritance, for example, traditionally posed 
difficulties and the concept of “freedom of willing” was adapted even by 
Quebec courts from English law. 
Furthermore, in practical terms the legal profession in Canada 
operates in one or more of four different legal systems: Francophone civil 
law; Francophone common law; Anglophone civil law; and, Anglophone 
common law. For citizens seeking equity and recourse in law precisely 
what the law might be or mean especially in respect to property could be 
confusing and frustrating. Bijural terminology is intended to provide specific 





English-language common law: French-language common law: 
1. “real property” 1. “bien réel” 
2. “mortgage”  2. “hypothèque” 
3. “lease” 3. “bail” 
English-language civil law: English-language civil law: 
1. “immovable” 1. “immeuble” 
2. “hypothec” 2. “hypothèque” 
3. “lease” 3. “bail” 
 
In Canada the existence of legislation in one or more languages 
always has necessitated more explicit or even flexible rules for statutory 
interpretation than those which have emerged often in an ad hoc manner 
from application and interpretation of the common law. For example, the 
original 1867 Canadian Constitution contains direction for the interpretation 
of bilingual legislation. This was expanded upon in the Constitution Act, 
1982. Furthermore, because all federal legislation in Canada must be in 
both official languages there has been a necessity for much more detailed 
guidance to statutory and regulatory interpretation16. Bilingualism, of 
course, may involve literal and conceptual similarities. However, when 
concepts are subject to judicial review and interpretation conceptual 
precision is absolutely essential. Bijuralism involves the transposition of 
legal terminology into both two languages and into two legal systems such 
that those affected by law, eg. taxation, marriage, inheritance, contracts, 
have a reasonable expectation that they will receive equitable treatment 
irrespective of where federal law is applied and especially where it is 
applied in conjunction with complementary provisions of provincial law. 
The requirement of bilingualism imposes upon both those who draft 
legislation and who interpret that legislation what is sometimes referred to 
as the shared meaning rule which requires those engaged in drafting and 
interpretation to assign the same meaning to words and phrases employed 
in statutes and regulations. As Justice P. Viau has observed: 
Deux langues, c’est d’abord deux styles, en matière de rédaction 
du moins. Et ailleurs aussi. Lois françaises et lois anglaises sont 
conçues différemment. Les mêmes idées ne se dissimulent pas de 
la même façon derrière des mots don’t le sens et la portée sont 
parfois difficiles à cerner17. 
English legal style, it has been noted, “subordinates every 
consideration to the search for precision. It attempts to say all, define all, to 
intimate nothing, and to never assume the intelligence of the reader...in the 
French style...one tries to find the precise word, and to formulate a general 
rule...”18. The civil law traces its roots to Roman law while the common law 
traces its roots to judicial interpretation beginning in about the 15th century 
in Britain and interpretations of the Royal Courts of Westminster on 
common (or customary) law and equity. 
The opportunity to make the Canadian legal system truly bijural 
emerged largely in response to a decision by the Government of Quebec to 
revise the Civil Code in 1955. Eventually this enormous task bore fruit with 
promulgation of a new Civil Code of Quebec on January 1st, 199419. 
At the federal level there has been in place a “joint legislative drafting 
policy” since 1978. However, that policy did not seek to ensure that all four 
of Canada’s legal audiences were employing the same legislative and 
regulatory language20. In 1993 a civil law section was created within the 
federal Department of Justice intended to begin the process of harmonizing 
federal laws with the then forthcoming, 1994, Civil Code of Quebec. In 
1995 the federal department of Justice approved a standing policy on 
legislative bijuralism. And, by 1999 a permanent programme component of 
the Department of Justice was assigned responsibility for the 
Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of 
Quebec. In January 2001, a Bill was Tabled in the Senate of Canada (Bill 
S-4) and eventually became law on June 1st, 2001 as the Federal Law-Civil 
Law Harmonization Act, No.1. 
In terms of operational federalism, the move towards a fully bijural 
legal system is very critical. For not only must federal law be applied to 
many areas of vital importance to individual citizens but federal law and 
provincial law in respect to the same general areas cannot be in conflict. 
Indeed, the concept of complementarity has been an important device for 
formally linking two levels and two traditions of law. 
Complementarity assumes that provincial legislation “complements” 
federal legislation in matters of property and in civil law matters21. Termed 
‘complementarity’ or ‘suppletive application of provincial legislation’. Thus, 
in interpreting a relevant federal statute the courts are enjoined to take into 
consideration the rules, concepts and principles in force in a particular 
province at the time, and on the occasion, the federal statute is being 
applied. In a classic case, for example, Canadian Merchant Marine Ltd. v. 
Canadian Trading Company22 the courts sought to link principles emerging 
from civil law with common law application. However, even this limited 
attempt is overshadowed by the much more common application of 
common law principles to civil law matters. Allard (2001) has suggested 
that “in the Supreme Court of Canada case law prior to repatriation of the 
appellate jurisdiction [in 1949, from the British Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council]. There are cases in which civil law rules had an influence on 
common law rules”. 
However, Glenn (1987, 1989) qualifies that but trend by noting that the 
influence of civil law upon common law was indirect and usually involved 
citation of English decisions which incorporated French civil law sources23. 
Eventually it became clear that there did not exist a reciprocal relationship 
between civil law and common law insofar as they pertained to respective 
legislative jurisdictions in Canada. Of course, there was also a widespread 
concern among Quebec civil law commentators and practitioners that 
“creeping” common law would eventually undermine the validity of the civil 
law tradition (Mignault, 1932; Azard, 1965; Baudouin, 1966; Normand, 
1987). Clearly, if a legal tradition and legal system are to be considered on 
equal value and validity –especially where jurisdictions intermingle– then it 
is imperative that real bijuralism exist. 
Brisson (1992), Brisson and Morel (1996) and Allard (2001) all have 
explored the relationship between federal law and Québec’s Civil Code 
insofar as a complementary exists. Historically, there was a widespread 
assumption that the common law prevailed in all matters within federal 
jurisdiction (Hogg, 1997, 181; 2000, 192) notes that until 1976, “there was 
substantial support for the view that a federal court could be given 
jurisdiction over any matter in relation to which the federal Parliament had 
legislative competence, even if that matter was not in fact regulated by 
federal statute law”. He concludes, “on this basis the ‘laws of Canada’ 
could include a rule of provincial statute law or a rule of the common law if 
its subject matter was such that the law could have been enacted or 
adopted by the federal Parliament. Then, in two decisions, the Supreme 
Court of Canada rejected the existing test of federal legislative 
competence. 
We will not engage in detailed discussion of two key cases beyond 
noting that they opened the door, as Allard suggests (2001, 22) “to the 
recognition of bijuralism with respect to federal legislation ...the expression 
‘laws of Canada’, was given a narrow interpretation”. 
In Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific (1976)24 
involving an alleged breach of contract to construct a marine terminal as 
part of a larger contract for transportation of newsprint from a paper 
manufacturing plant in Quebec to locations in the United States. The 
contract stipulated that it was to be interpreted in accordance with the civil 
law of Quebec. Federal legislative competence was assured because the 
contract involved international transportation and, thus, fell within federal 
jurisdiction under Sections 91(29) and 92(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
However, as the matter at issue was predominantly an issue of 
interpretation of contract and as the federal Parliament had not enacted 
any law governing such a contract, the Supreme Court held that a lower 
court (Federal court) could not constitutionally assume jurisdiction because 
the case was not governed by any existing applicable federal law. 
A somewhat similar situation arose in connection with construction of a 
federal penitentiary in Alberta in McNamara Construction v. The Queen 
(1977)25 where, again, a breach of contract was alleged. The Constitution 
Act, 1867 confers jurisdiction over penitentiaries to the federal government, 
Section 91(28). In the case of the province of Alberta the test was the 
common law itself but again the Supreme Court held that there had to be 
an explicit act by the federal Parliament to provide for an “applicable and 
existing federal law.” 
There has been significant criticism of both the Quebec North Shore 
and McNamara Construction cases because of the manner in which federal 
legislative competence was constrained. Hogg (1997, 182-183), for 
example, has argued that, 
Any laws within federal legislative competence could easily be 
converted into federal laws by the enactment of a federal statute 
incorporating them by reference (or adopting them) as federal 
statute law. Since this can be so easily done, it seems to me that 
laws within federal legislative competence should be regarded as 
laws of Canada26 without requiring the referential incorporation. 
He adds “I can see no reason why the rules of the common law in a 
field of federal legislative competence should not qualify as ‘laws of 
Canada’”. On the other hand, Allard (2001, 23) notes “while these decisions 
generate criticism at the procedural level, their effect on the recognition of a 
true complementary relationship between provincial law and federal law is 
clear”. He draws two conclusions: 
The first is that, since federal law is not autonomous, it must, in order 
to apply where federal law is silent, have a basis in provincial law rather 
than in a purely federal common law. The second is that, in the absence of 
a federal common law, provincial law must serve as the general law for 
federal law. 
Insofar as concerns federalism in Canada the situation is such that 
provincial law has been clearly affirmed as primary law in property and civil 
rights matters unless the federal government has explicitly exercised its 
legislative competence where such competence exists.  In practise this not 
only broadens the scope of provincial jurisdiction by effectively limiting an 
application of general principles of federal common law, but it opens the 
way to full fledged conceptual autonomy for Quebec’s civil law. Bijuralism 
effectively means, in the Canadian federal system, that when the courts 
apply federal laws which do not specifically exclude the application of 
provincial property and civil rights laws and concepts and, with specific 
application to Quebec, concepts which are specific to Quebec civil law now 
exist on a full and equal basis with the common law of all other provinces. 
In effect, the move towards a full bijural legislative system assures 
Quebec’s civil code of its continued relevance and vitality. 
Successful federalism works best when there exists mutual respect for 
the traditions, cultures and languages which activate the federal 
relationship. Indeed, concomitant with a successful federal relationship is 
the pervasiveness of a democratic political culture.  If democracy is to be 
truly respected then it is equally imperative that laws, obligations and rights 
be equally respected. The move towards effective bijuralism in Canada 
suggests not only respect for unique and valued cultures and traditions but, 
more fundamentally, an enhancement of the essence of democracy. 
Arguably, then, in its most fundamental form democracy itself in Canada is 
invigorated through a process of bijuralism. Let us look briefly at the 2001 
Harmonization Act. 
Federalism and Legislative Harmonization in Canada 
In one very astute observation, a senior legal official in Canada’s 
Department of Justice has reflected that: 
Federal law is not “an island unto itself”. Some federal enactments 
are fully comprehensive and self-contained. Others, however, can 
only be fully understood and comprehended if reference is made to 
extrinsic legal sources. In most instances, those external sources 
are composed of provincial law. While the content of provincial law 
may vary from province to province, the validity of any such 
provincial law, in large measure, depends of [sic] s. 92 of the 
Constitution Act 1867 (Molot, 2001,1) . 
The federal Parliament has no capacity to legislate in relation to 
provincial areas of jurisdiction nor does it have any power to legislate in 
relation to provincial laws made within those constitutional competencies. 
In practise, this division of powers is affirmed in the federal 
Interpretation Act27. Section 3(1) of this Act expressly limits the application 
of the provisions of the Act to federal legislation. Noteworthy is the fact that 
an Interpretation Act was the very first statute passed by the newly created 
Parliament of Canada in 1867.  In an appearance before the federal 
Parliament’s Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs in 1967, the 
then Deputy Minister of Justice, D.S. Thorson, pointed out that the 
purposes of an Interpretation Act were sixfold, to: 
I. establish uniform definitions and expressions in legislation; 
II. eliminate the need for constant repetition in the law; 
III. simplify the drafting of legislation; 
IV. facilitate interpretation of legislation;  
V. consolidate in one place rules of legislative construction and 
interpretation; and, 
VI. benefit parliamentarians, the courts and all persons concerned 
with understanding and interpreting legislation. 
In Canada the modern Interpretation Act also includes specific words 
and provisions authorising appointments of public officials and their 
removal, extending liability to the Crown (Her Majesty), and assorted other 
provisions essential to the enactment and implementation of legislation. 
The Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No.128, among many 
other things, provides for a very key amendment to the Interpretation Act.  
In its preamble the Harmonization Act expresses as purposes of the 
Act “the harmonious interaction of federal and provincial legislation” 
including “interpretation of federal legislation that is compatible with the 
common law or civil law traditions, as the case may be”. Furthermore, the 
preamble seeks to “facilitate access to federal legislation that takes into 
account the common law and civil law traditions, in its English and French 
versions”. This is achieved by adding a new Section 8 (Rules of 
Construction) to the Interpretation Act as follows: 
 
Property and Civil Rights Propriété et droits civils 
8.1 Both the common law and the civil law8.1 Le droit civil et la common law font 
are equally authoritative and recognized pareillement autorité et sont tous deux  
sources of the law of property and civil sources de droit en matière de propriété  
rights in Canada and, unless otherwise et de droits civils au Canada et, s’il est 
provided by law, if in interpreting an  nécessaire de recourir à des règles, 
enactment it is necessary to refer to a  principes ou notions appartenant au 
province’s rules, principles or concepts domaine de la propriété et des droits  
forming part of the law of property and civilcivils en vue d’assurer l’application d’un 
rights, reference must be made to the texte dans une province, il faut, sauf 
rules, principles and concepts in force in règle de droit s’y opposant, avoir recours 
the province at the time the enactment is au règles, principes et notions en  
being applied. vigueur dans cette province au moment 
 de l’application du texte 
8.2 Unless otherwise provided by law, 8.2 Sauf règle de droit s’y opposant, est 
when an enactment contains both civil  entendu dans un sens compatible avec  
law and common law terminology, or  le système juridique de la province 
terminology that has a different meaning d’application le texte qui emploie à la  
in the civil law and the common law, the  fois des termes propres au droit civil de 
civil law terminology or meaning is to be  la province de Québec et des termes 
adopted in the Province of Quebec and  propres à la common law des autres 
the common law terminology or meaning provinces, ou qui emploie des termes  
is to be adopted in the other provinces qui ont un sens differént dans l’un et 
 l’autre des ces systèmes 
 
This specific amendment to the federal Interpretation Act has great 
significance for the Canadian federal system in several respects. First, it 
places the civil law of Quebec on an equal footing with the common law 
before all Canadian courts. No longer should there be a concern of a 
‘creeping” of common law principles into the judicial interpretation on the 
civil code (Baudoin, 1966; Brisson, 1992). A process which really began in 
1774 but which has often been subsumed due to other exigencies such as 
war and depression can now be said to have reached a formal condition. 
The civil law insofar as it applies to those constitutionally empowered 
property and civil rights in Quebec is now secure. Second, it is clear, that in 
several other areas where federal jurisdiction interacts with provincial 
jurisdiction such as marriage, divorce, contracts and some forms of 
taxation, if federal law has not provided for a full and complete 
interpretation principles and concepts of the Quebec civil code may be 
employed. Complementarity is now the rule according to Section 8.1 and 
8.2 of the federal Interpretation Act. 
Third, there is an interesting prospect that Section 8 will offer some 
room for the incorporation of concepts inherent in the legal traditions and 
customs of the people of Canada’s First Nations. It is not specific in the 
section, but arguably to the extent that the courts may wish to make the 
Canadian legal system even more inclusive, there is room for innovation in 
legal interpretation. Finally, Section 8 offers as assurance to the legislators 
and to the various constituencies they represent that the law will mean the 
same thing to all Canadians at all levels of government and before all 
courts. In some respects this is little more than a practical recognition that 
despite many inherent differences within a federal political system, in the 
final analysis there is a reasonable expectation that equity will persist in the 
application of law across the country. 
This latter point takes on importance when one recalls that law is 
much more than statute. Law is applied through regulations, rules and 
interpretations. Law is also applied by public officials exercising 
administrative discretion and regulatory tribunals engaged in the delivery of 
public policy. 
Beyond the Interpretation Act, the federal Harmonization Act, No.1 
(2001) is a very extensive document as it amends dozens of federal 
statutes to ensure that their terminology reflects the bijuralistic goal. For 
example, the title of the federal Real Property Act/Lois sur les immeubles 
fédéraux has been replaced with a new title: Federal Real Property and 
Federal Immovables Act/ Lois sur les immeubles fédéraux et les biens 
réels fédéraux. Virtually every federal statute has some reference to 
“property” so, as a result, all had to be amended to encompass “property 
and immovables”29. The point should be stressed and that is when federal 
legislation in respect to property and civil rights is incomplete or silent on a 
specific concept thereby requiring supplementary use of provincial 
legislation, it is imperative that terminology be complementary or 
conceptually transferable. As Wellington (2001) noted: “The objective of 
harmonization is not to merge the common law and the civil law into one 
legislative norm, but rather to reflect the specificity of each system in 
federal law”. 
Wellington adds (2001,3) that the process of harmonization 
incorporates an assessment which includes statutory interpretation, 
constitutional law, private law in both civil and common law jurisdictions 
and, comparative law. The process consists of four stages ranging from an 
initial verification that a particular statute or provisions of a statute might 
apply to Quebec, then to “in context verification” placing a particular 
statutory enactment into its constitutional context and whether Parliament’s 
intent or any international treaty obligation is at issue. This includes 
“context verification” also examines the question of complementarity, eg. 
did Parliament intend provincial legislation to complement federal 
legislation in property and civil rights matters. There are circumstances 
where a federal statutes specifically prohibits the supplementary application 
of provincial law, for example, Canadian maritime law30. 
Once the context has been assessed, the third stage consists of 
explicit identification of points of contact between federal and provincial 
private law. For example, a legislative drafter might wish to ask whether it 
was Parliament’s intention to dissociate an enactment from civil law or 
whether Parliament would have wanted a civil law concept to be added. 
Finally, the “points of contact” are analysed in detail and an full effort is 
made to verify that any new meaning or terms to be incorporated in a 
statute reflect the full intention of Parliament as well as the historical 
evolution of the statute itself. Eventually new terminology and concepts 
must also be reflected bilingually irrespective of the particular legal 
system31. Thereafter recommendations are made for the harmonization of a 
particular statute or sections of a statute (Wellington, 2001, 7-8). These 
recommendations apparently involve one or more of four steps: 1) 
replacing an old term with a new one; 2) revising the wording of an already 
enacted provision in accordance with a new bijural term; 3) simple 
elimination of outdated or obsolete terms with no replacement; and, if 
necessary, proposing a French language equivalent for a common law 
term. 
When necessary techniques are employed to develop common terms 
be they neutral, ‘generic’ or general so that the same term can be 
employed in both civil and common law, eg. “lease”/“bail” or “loan”/“prêt”. 
Definitions are also employed in order to provide specific meanings to 
terms in both civil law and common law, eg Section 25 of the 
Harmonization Act, No.1 (2001) reads: 
 
25. The definition “secured creditor” 25. La définition de «créancier 
in subsection 2(1) of the Bankruptcy garanti», au paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi 
and Insolvency Act* is replaced by  sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité, est 
the following: remplacé par ce qui suit: 
“Secured creditor” means a person  “Créancier garanti” Personne titulaire 
holding a mortgage, hypothec, pledge,  d’une hypothèque, d’un gage, d’une 
charge or lien on or against the property  charge ou d’un privilège sur ou contre 
of the debtor or any part of that property  les biens du débiteur ou une partie de 
as security for a debt due or accruing due ses biens, à titre de garantie d’une dette 
to the person from the debtor, or a person échue ou à échoir, ou personne don’t la 
whose claim is based on, or secured by, a réclamation est fondée sur un effet de 
negotiable instrument held as collateral  commerce ou garantie par ce dernier, 
security and on which the debtor is only  lequel effet de commerce est détenu 
indirectly or secondarily liable, and  comme garantie subsidiar et don’t le 
includes débiteur n’est responsable  
(a) a person who has a right of retention qu’indirectement ou secondairement. 
or a prior claim constituting the real right, S’entend en outre: 
within the meaning of the Civil Code of  a) de la personne titulaire, selon le Code 
Quebec or any other statute of the  civil du Québec ou les autres lois de la 
Province of Quebec, on or against the  province de Québec, d’un droit de  
property of the debtor or any part of that  rétention ou d’une priorité constitutive de 
property, or droit réel sur ou contre les biens du 
(b) any of débiteur ou une partie de ses biens; 
 (i) the vendor of any property sold to the  b) lorsque l’exercise de ses droits est 
debtor under a conditional or installment  assujetti aux règles prévues pour  
sale, l’exercise des droits hypothécaires, au  
 (ii) the purchaser of any property from thelivre sixième du Code civil du Québec 
debtor subject to a right of redemption, or intitulé Des priorités et des 
 (iii) the trustee of a trust constituted by hypothèques: 
the debtor to secure the performance of  (i) de la personne qui vend un bien au 
an obligation, If the exercise of the   débiteur, sous condition ou à  
person’s rights is subject to the provisions tempérament, 
of Book Six of the Civil Code of Quebec  (ii) de la personne qui achète un bien  
entitled Prior Claims and Hypothecs that au débiteur avec faculté de rachat en 
deal with the exercise of hypothecary faveur de celui-ci, 
rights;..  (iii) du fiduciaire d’une fiducie constituée  
 par le débiteur afin de garantir 
 l’exécution d’une obligation 
*R.S.C. (1985) c. B-3 
 
While this is a long definition it does illustrate the point that legislative 
bijuralism can be facilitated by providing specific definitions for specific 
concepts. 
Harmonization also can occur through expressing a legal rule for each 
legal system in different terms. This is called doubling and can be done by 
placing one term for each legal system next to each other. This also done 
by offering concepts specific to each legal system in separate paragraphs. 
This is know in Great Britain as a Scottish clause which permits the British 
Parliament to enact special legislative provisions applicable to Scottish law. 
On the whole it would appear that the effort to harmonize legislation in 
Canada to fully accommodate two distinct legal systems is a very positive 
contribution to the maturation of the entire federal system. Indeed, what the 
Canadians have proposed to any interested party is that the pioneering 
work in the filed of legislative harmonization and bijuralism offers example 
and direction to other states and communities grappling with better ways to 
serve their citizens. 
Canadian federalism has had the remarkable experience of maturing 
as it moves from generation to generation. Their have been severe strains 
and even limited violence in the 1970's. Proposals by the Province of 
Quebec to secede are part of the political inter-lay of the federal 
relationship and while they may be muted now there is always a possibility 
that tension can lead to conflict and severance within the federal system. 
Whether that would be legal or not is another issue (Brown-John, 2002). 
Yet federalism is a dynamic process and requires constant 
accommodation of the interests and rights of all parties. Moreover, 
federalism as we are discovering in Canada also requires respect and the 
Harmonization Act, (2001) suggests that in a very fundamental manner that 
respect is becoming fully and effectively entrenched in Canada’s legal 
system. 
Conclusion 
Our late friend and colleague, Daniel Elazar, in one of his last 
published essays made a plea for a world “where people are encouraged to 
be citizens and not just consumers, and leaders must be responsible to 
them in some meaningful way” (2002, 25). For such a world to persist we 
need to garner constant respect for rights and property. It is no accident 
that both federalism and democracy thrive best where rights and property 
are fully respected. 
We suggest that Canada’s federal system has moved, quietly, forward 
on both the levels of improved democracy and enhanced federalism with a 
major effort to provide a full and respected status to bot legal systems 
which constitute the environment within which Canadians live and prosper. 
Bijuralism is a concept which captures both the practical requirement to 
develop meaningful law and to provide guidance for those who prepare the 
laws and those who interpret the laws. Bijuralism inherently suggests that 
laws should not only form intelligible patterns of ideas and concepts but 
that those concepts should be mindful and respectful of the rich traditions 
from which they emerge. The Civil Code of Quebec is a vital practical and 
historic component of the unique fabric of Canadian society. That the 
harmonization process provides an apparent absolute assurance that the 
civil law, insofar as it pertains to property and civil rights, has a place of 
equal prominence and status within the federal system seems to be worthy 
and noble endeavour. 
We feel that sharing some information about Canada’s bijural legal 
system may open the way for other progressive and creative political 
systems to likewise seek to engage all legal traditions in the promotion of 
democracy, civil rights and respect for individuals32. 
The task is enormously complex but surely the rewards in terms of 






1. One observer has suggested that a more accurate description would employ 
the term “plurijuridalism” or “legal pluralism”. This has been suggested in an 
effort to accommodate both Aboriginal Canadian rights and the somewhat 
different approaches to the common law among Canadian provinces. See: 
Brierley, (1992). Only about 15 countries in the world share the combination of 
civil law and common law. 
2. Of which there are 40 in Canada. One of which, Wood Buffalo National Park, 
is larger than Belgium. 
3. For those unfamiliar with the role of The Crown in Canada some explanation is 
required. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II is Queen of Great Britain. She is also 
Head of the Commonwealth which includes Canada. Constitutionally she is 
also Queen of Canada by right of Canada. In practise this means that the 
Parliament of Canada approved, by Resolution, her right to represent the 
Crown (Head of State) in Canada. Constitutionally she is represented at the 
federal level by the Governor General and at the provincial level by Lieutenant 
Governors. The Government of Canada makes no financial contribution to the 
Queen other than when she or another member of the Royal family visit 
Canada as guests. Personally, the Queen has no formal authority over any 
matter within Canada and is simply an highly respected symbol of the dignity 
and authority of the state. 
4. In: R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; Ex parte 
Indian Association of Alberta [1982] QB 892 (CA), in which aboriginal peoples 
brought a suit in the United Kingdom to enforce original treaty obligations to 
aboriginal peoples undertaken by the Crown during the colonial period, the 
Court held that the obligations had long since passed to Canada and were 
enforceable only against the Crown “by right of Canada” in Canadian courts. 
The Crown was clearly divisible: the “Crown by right of Canada” and the 
“Crown by right of the United Kingdom”. 
5. There is an enormous legal history of recognition of this divisibility of the 
Crown in Canada beginning with an 1892 of the British Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council: Liquidators of the Maritime Bank v. Receiver General of 
New Brunswick [1892] AC 437. 
6. The two concurrent powers in Section 95 (Agriculture and Immigration) 
effectively constitute the most restricted set of concurrent powers of any formal 
federal constitution. 
7. McGill Sociologist Maurice Pinard (1976) explored the link between culture, 
political parties and attitudes towards a federal or national culture in Québec. 
8. The existence within Canada of native legal traditions some of which have 
become part of applied Canadian law especially in criminal and property 
matters suggests a limited informal multijural legal system. 
9. See Brunet, et al (1952, 112-113). The provision reads: “...dans toute cause 
ou action civile entre sujets-nés britanniques, le jury devra se composer de 
sujets-nés britanniques seulement; que dans toute cause ou action entre 
Canadiens le jury devra se composer de Canadiens seulement; et dans toute 
cause ou action entre sujets-nés britanniques et Canadiens, le jury devra se 
composer d’un nombre égal de chaque nationalité si l’une ou l’autre partie en 
fait la demande...”. 
10. U.K. 1867, 30-31 Victoria, c. 3. And, since 1982, The Canada Act, 1982, (U.K.) 
1982 c.11. 
11. Property and civil rights generally has been interpreted to include all forms of 
civil society relations including contracts. 
12. Union Colliery v. Bryden, 1899) AC 580 at 588. 
13. As will be discussed in more detail later, this terminology was altered when the 
Civil Code was revised and promulgated as a new Quebec Civil Code in 1994.  
The extensive revisions of the 1866 Code prompted the federal government to 
review the entire relationship between federal law and provincial law especially 
civil code law. 
14. France abandoned its colony of New France to the British conquerors by the 
Treaty of Paris of 1763. In a British statute of 1774 (An Act for making more 
effectual Provision for the Government of the Province of Quebec in North 
America usually termed simply “The Quebec Act”), the civil code was affirmed. 
It was subsequently re-affirmed on two other occasions as the applicable legal 
system for “Lower Canada” or “Canada East” as Quebec was known prior to 
the 1867 Confederation of Canada. Between 1760 and 1774 the applicable 
law in Quebec remained the Coutume de Paris. 
15. As near as can be determined the first reference to bijural in reference to 
terminology of legal drafting in Canada seems to have been in 1984 in a 
Department of Justice, Translation Bureau, Terminology Update, vol. 17 (7 & 
8). 
16. For example: the federal Interpretation Act,  RSC 1985, c.I-21; the federal 
Statutory Instruments Act, RSC 1985, c. S-22. Even regular statutory revisions 
require consideration of bilingual wording: eg. Revised Statutes of Canada 
1985 Act (3d Supp), c.40. Also see: Beaupré (1986) and Côté (1990) re: 
bilingual statutory interpretation. 
17. Quoted in Gervais and Séguin (2001), “Some Thoughts on Bijuralism in 
Canada and the World” in Canada, Department of Justice: The Harmonization 
of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and 
Canadian Bijuralism. Ottawa, Department of Justice. P. 4. (This is a CD-Rom 
version). 
18. Justice Louis-Phillipe Pigeon quoted in ibid, p.4. 
19. Almost 80% of the original 1866 Civil Code of Lower Canada were amended 
by the 1994 Civil Code. 
20. The 1978 policy emerged from recommendations of Canada’s Commissioner 
of Official Languages. In response, the federal Department of Justice 
established two internal committees, the Garon Committee in 1977 and, the 
Desjardins Committee in 1978 to examine the issues identified by the Official 
Languages Commissioner. 
21. The problem can be seen, for example, in situations where issues transcend 
constitutional jurisdictions. For example, while the provinces have exclusive 
jurisdiction over property [Section 92(13)], certain areas of property and civil 
law, for example bankruptcy and insolvency, bills of exchange, marriage and 
divorce, fall within federal jurisdiction [Sections 91(18), 91(21) and 91(26)] of 
the Constitution Act, 1867. Indeed, some federal statutes even include 
concepts derived from provincial private law, eg. security and the notion of 
‘distribution’; see, for example, the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 
RSC (1985), c.B-3, section 136. 
22. [1922] 64 SCR 106. 
23. Baudouin (1975) concluded that there was not one single example of civil law 
principles influencing common law issues. Indeed, it is very unlikely that prior 
to 1949 any decision on Quebec law was ever cited as a precedent before the 
British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council –Canada’s final court of appeal 
until 1949. 
24. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054. 
25. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 655. 
26. In accordance with Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
27. S.C. 1967-1968, c. 7. 
28. S.C. 2001 c. 4. 
29. There are over 700 federal statutes which will be harmonized eventually. 
Initially each statute has to be reviewed in terms of two things: 1) does it have 
application to Québec and thus, 2) does it rely upon the civil law in some 
manner as supplementary law? An initial review suggested that no fewer than 
350 federal statutes might apply to Québec. 
30. This specific prohibition of recourse to provincial law in a federal statute is 
termed dissociation. 
31. For over 20 years there has existed a National Programme for the Integration 
of Two Official Languages in the Administration of Justice (POLAJ). See: 
http://www.pajlo.org/english/who/pajlo_eng.html. 
32. Canada’s Department of Justice appears to be anxious to share its experience 
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